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ST. LOUIS JAW REVIEW
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS.*
I.
I: This article is not intended to be an exhaustive digest
of all decisions. It has Iong since become impossible to
reconcile any long course of decision upon any subject; and
the treatment is intended to be suggestive rather than
complete.
2: The writ of habeas corpus is a remedial process,
whereof the name and general incidents are derived from
the common law.' The phrase "habeas corpus" is properly
generic, and includes several species of writs.2 These species
fall naturally into two classes, viz: Ancillary and Independent.
Ancillary writs were (1) habeas corpus cum causa
(sometimes called habeas corpus ad faciendum et recipi-
endune); (2) habeas corpus a4 respondendum; (3) habeas
corpus ad satisficiendum, and (4) habeas corpus ad testi-
ficandum.8
The great (or Independent) writ was known as habeas
corpus ad subjiciendum; and that writ is usually meant when
the term "habeas corpus" without qualification is employed.4
The classification into Ancillary and Independent is not
customary, but is here adopted for purposes of analysis. The
writs termed Ancillary were all used to enable a court
effectively to exercise its jurisdiction over a case brought or
to be brought before it. They were, organically, procedural
*By Charles P. Williams, of the St. Louis Bar,
1. Ex parte Slebold, 100 U. S., 1. c. 375.
2. Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 1. c. 06.
3. Cf. ex parte Bolhnan, 4 Cranch, 1. c. 96; as to ad testificandum,
see In re Thaw, 166 Fed. 71.
4. Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 1. c. 95.
5. Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 1. c. 96, et seq.
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steps in that case; whereas the proceedings under the great
writ constitute an independent action."
3: The writ of habeas corpus (meaning habeas corpus
ad subjiciendum) is a remedy given by the common law to
vindicate the right of personal liberty." It was originally in
the nature of a prerogative writ; s but it is held that the
proceedings upon application therefor constitute a case or
.SUit,9 civil in character.10 As such, it must be implicit in the
catalogue of jurisdiction laid down in Article 3 of the Con-
stitution. The only other constitutional source possible would
be the prohibition against suspension." To treat this as the
affirmative grant of power runs counter to the ordinary use
of language,'2 and seems opposed to the theories underlying
all judicial reasoning on the subject.
The objection to derivation of the writ solely from the
grant of judicial power is that the judicial power is vested
in courts, and not in judges;'3 whereas, from the beginning
of our system power to issue and determine the writ has been
distinctly vested by statute in the judges as well as in the
courts. Possible explanations for this anomaly are (1) the
chamber and vacation powers of the judge, or (2) the (leg-
islatively) implied perpetual session of the court for the
purposes of the writ. As a matter of common law, chamber
and vacation powers do not include the right of final adjudi-
cation of the case.1 4 The theory of implied perpetual session
6. Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U. S., 1. c. 559; Riddle v. Dyche, 67 Co-op.
Advance, 612.
7. Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet., 1. c. 202.
8. Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet., 1. c. 202; In re Burrus, 136 U. S., 1. c. 615.
9. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall., 1. c. 113; ex parte Tom Tong, 103 U. S.,
1. c. 559; Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet., 1. c. 564, 567.
10. Fisher v. Baker, 203 U. S. 174; ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U. S. 556.
11. Article I, Section 9, U. S. Constitution.
12. Ex parte Caldwell, 138 Fed. 487.
13. Article III, Section 1, U. S. Constitution.
14. Cf. State ex rel. v. Woodson, 161 Mo. 444; but see Carter v. Gear,
197 U. S. 348.
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makes the particular judge identical with the court, which is
open to serious objection.' 5 The issue and determination of
the writ are matters peculiarly judicial and essentially a
part of that power.16 In view of the history of the writ, there
is no reason why we should not frankly recognize the judge
in this instance as the repository of judicial power. The
habeas corpus of our fathers was that embalmed in the
English Habeas Corpus Act.17 That Act resolved the doubt
of the common law courts as to the power to issue and hear
the writ in vacation1 s by emphatically imposing that duty
upon the judges in vacation as well as in term. The prohi-
bition against suspension is broad enough to preserve the
constant right to the writ then enjoyed in Great Britain.
Certainly it was never intended that Congress must leave the
writ utterly unavailable during the long vacations used by
early federal courts. Constitutional history, coupled with
the express prohibition, qualifies in this regard the grant of
judicial power to the courts.
4: No court (or judge) of the United States can enter-
tain an application for an independent writ of habeas corpus,
unless jurisdiction so to do has been conferred by statute.' 9
Ancillary writs, as mere procedural steps in a case whereof
jurisdiction has been conferred, probably need no express
statutory authorization.2 ° A general procedural statute, 21
15. See Carper v. Fitzgerald, 121 U. S. 87; Lambert v. Barrett, 157
U. S. 697; McKnight v. James, 155 U. S. 685; Harkrader v. Wadley, 172
U. S., 1. c. 162; see, however, the somewhat extraordinary result In ex
parte Craig, 68 Co-op. Advance, 124.
16. Cf. ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall., 1. c. 95.
17. Cf. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall., 1. c. 11.4-115; ex parte Yerger,
8 Wall., 1. c. 95; King v. McLean Asylum, 64 Fed., 1. c. 342.
18. Cf. Jenkes' Case, 6 How. St. Tr., folio 1196.
19. Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 1. c. 94; ex parte Parks, 93 U. S., 1. c.
22; Re Neagle, 135 U. S., 1. c. 78.
20. Cf. In re Burrus, 136 U. S., 1. c. 607.
21. Judicial Code, §262.
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however, exists, broad enough in language to include such
ancillary writs; and there are some particular statutes which
expressly provide therefor, although not by such a designa-
tion.22 Our statutes, really, to some extent confuse the dis-
tinction between ancillary and independent writ.
The general statutes granting jurisdiction to issue the
writ of habeas corpus are exceedingly vague. In their present
form23 they read as follows:
"Sec. 751. The Supreme Court and the Circuit and
District Courts shall have power to issue writs of habeas
corpus."
"See. 752. The several Justices and Judges of the said
courts, within their respective jurisdictions, shall have power
to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry
into the cause of restraint of liberty."
5: It is a truism, generally speaking, that federal juris-
diction postulates the presence in the case of either federal
question or diversity of citizenship. The statutes just quoted
are impliedly limited by this requirement. Indeed there is
considerable doubt whether diversity of citizenship can found
jurisdiction over the writ. If that doubt can be justified, it
must be upon the ground that a proceeding in habeas corpus
is not to be regarded as a mere suit inter partes, but as retain-
ing its ancient prerogative character-as being an inquiry by
the sovereign into an imprisonment of its subject, contrary
to its laws. If regarded as a proceeding between parties-
the claimant of liberty being deemed the plaintiff, and the
person against whom the writ is sought, the defendant-
diversity of citizenship is a valid foundation for the juris-
diction. The Supreme Court has declined to pass upon this
question; taking the position, in the cases that have come
before it, that, in any event, civil liberty is incalculable and
22. Judicial Code, §32; §33.
23. R. S. 1§ 751 and 752.
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the statutory amount conditioning federal jurisdiction was
not involved.24
Even if we should assume diversity of citizenship to be
a proper basis generally, it is still doubtful whether the fed-
eral courts could be empowered, by means of the writ, to
assume jurisdiction, as parens patriae, to determine the
proper custody for those incapable or not sid juris, where
some custody is confessedly necessary. 25
6: Practically, as the matter stands at present, the
federal right to issue the writ is limited to cases of detention
alleged to be contrary to federal law, including some cases
under the law of nations.26  A mere" trespass by private per-
sons upon the right of personal liberty ordinarily involves no
federa] question; so that the detention redressible must gen-
erally be by persons acting, or claiming colorably to act, under
public authority.
7: For over forty years after the Government was
formed, the federal writ of habeas corpus reached no prisoner
in custody under the laws of a State except to require his
attendance as a witness in the federal court.27. The original
Judiciary Act granted generally to specified courts and judges
the power to issue the writ, "provided * * (it) * * shall in
no case extend to prisoners in jail, unless when they are in
custody under or by color of the authority of the United
States, or are committed for trial before some court of the
same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify." 28
24. Cf. Matters v. Ryan, 249 U. S. 375; ex parte Burrus, 136 U. S., 1. c.
596; Barry v. Mercein, 5 How., 1. c. 120.
25. Cf. King v. McLean Asylum, 64 Fed. 331; New York Foundling
Asylum v. Gatti, 203 U. S. 429.
26. Matters v. Ryan, 249 U. S. 375; Carper v. Caldwell, 200 U. S. 293;
Stortl v. Massachusetts, 183 U. S., I. c. 142; ex parte Burrus, 136 U. S. 586.
27. Ex parte Dorr, 3 How.. 1. c. 105; ex parte McCann, F. C. 8679; ex
parte Cabrera, I Wash., C. C. 232, F. C. 2278; for general history of federal
writ, see ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85; ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18; Cun.
ningham v. Neagle, 135 U. S. 1; ex parte Burrus, 136 U. S. 586.
28. 1 Stat. at L. 81.
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The asserted state right of Nullification was the occa-
sion for the first enlargement in scope of the writ in 1833.29
The second came in 1842, when the refusal of New York
to release a British Agent charged with acts done under the
purported authority of his government brought us to the
verge of warA0
The third and final extension was part of the policy of
reconstruction in 1867.31
29. 4 Stat. at L. 634. "And be It further enacted, That either of the
justices of the Supreme Court, or a judge of any District Court of the
United States, in addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall
have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases of a prisoner or
prisoners, in jail or confinement, where he or they shall be committed or
confined on, or -by any authority or law, for any act done, or omitted to be
done. in pursuance of a law of the United States, or any order, process or
decree, or any Judge or court thereof, anything in any act of Congress to
the contrary notwithstanding."
30. 5 Stat. at. L., 539: "Be it enacted . . That either of the
justices of the Supreme Court, . . . or judge of any District Court of
the United States, in which a prisoner is confined, in addition to the author-
ity already conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs of habeas
corpus in all cases of any prisoner or prisoners in jail or confinement,
where he, she, or they, being subjects or citizens of a foreign state, and
domiciled therein, shall be committed or confined, or in custody, under or
by any authority or law, or process founded thereon, of the United States,
or of any one of them, for or on account of any act done or omitted under
any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption, set
up or claimed under the commission, or order, or sanction, of any foreign
State or Sovereignty, the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law
of nations, or under color thereof . .
31. 14 Stat. at L. 385: ". . The several courts of the United
States, and the several justices and judges of such courts, within their
respective jurisdictions, in addition to the authority already conferred . ..
shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any
person may be restrained of . . . liberty in violation of the Constitu-
tion, or of any law or treaty of the United States . . . The said court
or judge shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the
case, by hearing testimony and the arguments of the parties interested,
and if it shall appear that the petitioner is deprived of his or her liberty
in contravention of the Constitution or laws of the United States, he or she
shall forthwith be discharged and set at liberty .
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol9/iss4/2
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8: Upon the compilation of the Revised Statutes, the
original proviso and the three enlargements above listed were
fused and combined into R. S. 753.32 That section is in the
form of a limitation; but is composed, for the most part, of
statutes which were sweeping grants of judicial authority.
In the light of its history it affirms the power of the federal
courts and judges to issue the writ in the excepted instances.
Unquestionably the power to issue now extends to every
detention in jail or elsewhere, by state or other authority
whatsoever, shown to be contrary to the constitution, laws
or treaties of the United States.3
The exercise of that power is limited (1) by regard for
the inherited nature of the writ; and (2) by importing into
the construction of the statutory power a theory of restrictive
judicial discretion.
Because this second limitation is capable of fairly easy
statement (although occasionally quite perplexing in prac-
tical application) we shall dispose of it first. It may be
formulated as follows:
The writ of habeas corpus is in the nature of an extraor-
dinary remedy; and even where the power to issue is plain,
32. R. S. 753: "The writ of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to
a prisoner in jail, unless where he is in custody under or by color or
authority of the United States, or is committed for trial before some court
thereof; or is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law
of the United States, or of an order, process, or decree of a court or judge
thereof; or is in custody in violation of the Constitution or of a law or
treaty of the United States; or, being a subject or citizen of a foreign
state, and domiciled therein, is in custody for an act done or omitted
under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption
claimed under the commission, or order, or sanction of any foreign state,
or under color thereof, the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law
of nations; or unless it is necessary to bring the prisoner into court to
testify."
33. Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U. S. 231; ex parte McCardle. 6 Wall,
318; ex parte Burrus, 136 U. S. 586; note, that an order or judgment of a
federal court is assimilated by the language of the statute to a law; and
the breadth given to the word "law" in the extraordinary case of In re
Neagle, 135 U. S. 1.
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if the wrongs or errors complained of are redressible by
error or appeal, either to a higher executive tribunal or state
or federal court, the court applied to should usually refuse
the writ, in all cases save those of urgent and exceptional
character. 3a This rule applies both before and after trial.34
It is applicable both to federal and stateP6 proceedings.
Urgent or exceptional instances have been grouped in the
notes.-0a
33a. Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241; ex parte Fonda, 117 U. S. 5161
re Duncan, 139 U. S. 449; re Wood, 140 U. S. 278; Cook v. Hart, 146 U. S.
183; re Frederich, 149 U. S. 70; New York v. Eno, 155 U. S. 89; re Chap-
man, 156 U. S. 211; re Belt, 159 U. S. 95; Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U. S.
231; Baker v. Grice, 169 U. S. 284; Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U. S., 1. c. 104;
Fitts v. McGehee, 172 U. S., 1. c. 532; Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U. S. 184;
Davis v. Burke, 179 U. S. 399; Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 U. S. 499; U. S.
v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161, where writ denied because no appeal had been
taken to Secretary of Treasury; Riggins v. U. S., 199 U. S. 547; re Lincoln,
202 U. S. 178; Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U. S. 179; ex parte Spencer, 228 U. S.
652; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S., 1. c. 328; Jones v. Perkins, 245 U. S. 390.
34. Glasgow v. Mayer, 225 U. S. 420; ordinarily refused before trial,
see Jones v. Perkins, 245 U. S. 390; Johnson v. Hay, 227 U. S. 245; Riggins
v. U. S., 199 U. S. 547; Homer v. U. S., 143 U. S. 570.
35. Re Chapman, 156 U. S. 211; Riggins v. U. S., 199 U. S. 547; Jones
v. Perkins, 245 U. S. 390; ex parte Mirzan, 119 U. S. 584; ex parte Lancaster,
137 U. S. 393; re Lincoln, 202 U. S. 178.
36. See generally Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U. S. 231; Baker v. Grice,
169 U. S. 284; Drury v. Lewis, 200 U. S. 1; Urquhart v. Brown, 205 L. S.
179; and many of the other cases cited under note 33a, supra.
36a. Exceptional instances, not always clearly put upon a particular
ground, see: re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1, where a deputy marshal in strte cus-
tody, charged with homicide, committed while protecting a federal judge,
was discharged; in re Loney, 134 U. S. 372, discharging a prisoner in state
custody under a charge of which federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction;
Wildenhus' Case, 120 U. S., I. c. 17, where it is suggested foreign seaman,
held for misconduct for which, under treaty, he was exclusively Eubject to
consul, might have writ-case referred to as exceptional in Whitten v.
Tomlinson, 160 U. S., 1. c. 242; intimation in U. S. v. Rauscher, 119 U. S.,
1. 4. 431, that one, held for another crime than that on which extradition had,
entitled to writ; Ticket agent, arrested under rate statute which had been
enjoined by federal court, Hunter v. Wood, 209 U. S. 205; see Ohio v.
Thomas, 173 U. S. 276, where superintendent cf U. S. institution arrested
for serving butter substitute, authorized by federal law; 13oske v. Comin-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol9/iss4/2
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9: Turning now to the first limitation, it is laid down
generally by many cases that the writ reaches solely the
question of jurisdiction or authority.37 It does not at all
concern itself with mere errors committed in the exercise of
jurisdiction or authority-unless destructive thereof.3 It is,
emphatically, not a substitute for the writ of error.30
Such, unquestionably, was the common law function of
the writ. Under our system of constitutional law, our division
of sovereignty between state and nation with the right of the
latter, by its courts, authoritatively to determine national
questions,--the foregoing formula, in its simple form, is
hardly adequate to explain all the cases; as will hereafter
appear.
Assuming, for the moment, its general validity, we may
gore, 177 U. S. 459, where U. S. collector was discharged from contempt
proceedings, Instituted to compel him to produce distillers' reports, con-
trary to federal regulations; re Nielsen, 131 U. S. 176, where face of rec-
ord showed prisoner had before been convicted of same offense; ree cita-
tions In ex parte Craig, 282 Fed., 1. c. 149.
See remarks of Court in ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, frequently
quoted.
The requirement of appeal or error is apparently sometimes overlooked.
Cf. Baender v. Barnett, 255 U. S. 224; Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U. S. 368; Matter
of Gregory, 219 U. S. 210; in all of which relief was refused, after full dis-
cussion of merits of contentions. It may be the court concluded to settle
the questions involved.
37. Re Chapman, 156 U. S., 1. c. 215; re Schneider, 148 U. S. 162; re
Belt, 159 U. S. 95; ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S., 1. c. 375; Davis v. Beason,
133 U. S. 333; re Wight, 134 U. S., 1. c. 148; Dimmick v. Tompkins, 194
U. S.8, 1. c. 552; in re Frederich, 149 U. S., 1. c. 76; Harland v. McGourin,
218 U. S,, 1. c. 445; Collins v. McDonald, 258 U. S., 1. c. 418;. Valentina v.
Mercer, 201 U. S., 1. c. 138; Collins v. Johnston, 237 U. S., 1. c. 505; ex parte
Caril, 106 U. S. 521; ex parte Tyler, 149 U. S., I. c. 180; Riggins v. U. S., 199
U. S., I. c. 548; ex parte Ulrich, 43 Fed., L c. 663.
88. Cf. McMicking v. Shields, 238 U. S., . c. 106; Frank v. Mangum,
237 U. S., 1. c. 327; re Lane, 135 U, S., 1. c. 448.
39. Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U. S., 1. c. 428; JQhnson v. Hoy, 227 U. S.
245; Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U. S., 1. c. 445. A possible exception is noted
in ex parte Slebold, 100 U. S. 371, where the issuing court is vested with
appellate jurisdiction, and the error is apparent, but this Is seldom, if ever,
followed;
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distinguish (1) the initial attachment of jurisdiction, and
(2) the subsequent infection thereof by fundamental error.
Therefore, to review proceedings by a federal writ of habeas
corpus either (1) subject matter, person or res must have
been removed from the field of jurisdiction by federal con-
stitution, statute or treaty; or (2) jurisdiction over subject
matter, person or res, having initially attached, -must be de-
stroyed by the violation of some provision of federal consti-
tution, statute or treaty.
Authority, rather than jurisdiction, is properly predi-
cable of officers and tribunals other than courts; but an
analogous classification must be applicable to them.
Instances of the first class, where initial jurisdiction, (or
authority) does not attach, and a federal court has power to
issue the writ, are set forth in the note.40
40. Detention under statutes contrary to paramount federal law, which
can therefore confer no jurisdiction to punish for their violation: ex parte
Siebold, 100 U. S. 371; ex parte Yarborough, 110. U. S. 651; Fitts v. McGehee,
172 U. S., 1. c. 532; matter of Heff, 197 U. S. 488; in re Coy, 127 U. S., 1. c.
758; James v. Bowman, 190 U. S. 127.
Commitment for contempt of injunction restraining commission of
mere crime, or infringement of purely political rights, ex parte Sawyer,
124 U. S. 200. Detention of Indian for offense of which exclusive jurisdic-
tion had been vested by treaty in tribal courts, ex parte Mayfield, 141 U. S.
107: ex parte Kang-GI-Shun-Ca, 109- U. S. 556; detention by state for offense
over which federal jurisdiction exclusive, re Loney, 134 U. S. 372; imprison-
ment of federal officer, under state process, for act done under federal law,
Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U. S. 1; detention under federal law repealed
by admission of state, ex parte Webb, 225 U. S. 663; detention by state on
one charge, after extradition on another, Cosgrove v. Winney, 174 U. S.
64; ex parte Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407; imprisonment, under sentence of
court martial, of one never subject to military law, ex parte Milligan, 4
Wall. 1; Attempt by executive authority to deport one claiming to be citi-
zen, Ng Fung Cho v. White, 259 U. S. 276; Imprisonment for contempt in
refusing to give deposition after removal to federal court, ex parte Fisk,
113 U. S. 713; Trial by District Court, when jurisdiction exclusive in Terri-
torial Court, ex parte Gon-Shay-ee, 130 U. S. 343; Contempt In violating
mandamus granted without jurisdiction, ex parte Rlowland, 104 1". S. 604;
State statute invalid in attempting to punish managers of federal institu-
tion, Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U. S. 276.
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Under the second class, we are called upon to distinguish
between a mere error in the course of jurisdiction, and such
a departure from federal rules governing the play and exer-
cise of jurisdiction as to vitiate the result. The distinction
seems one of degree and the tendency in latter times is
strongly restrictive. Examples are appended.4 1
41. Attempted amendment of indictment by District Attorney, ex parte
Bain, 121 U. S. 1; trial for infamous crime without indictment, in re Sawyer,
124 U. S. 200; without jury, ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417.; Domination of
court and jury by mob, so as to render conviction automatic and mechan-
ical, Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86; Manifest unfairness in conduct or
executive deportation hearing, by refusing to hear, or suppressing vital
evidence, Chin Yow v. U. S., 208 U. S. 8; Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U. S.
454; refusal of commissioner in removal proceedings to hear evidence
proving no offense in district to which removal sought, Tinsley v. Treat,
205 U. S. 20.
The following are instances of mere (or non.jurisdictional) error:
Compelling prisoner to exhibit gait and carriage, or otherwise give evidance
against himself, Collins v. McDonald, 258 U. S., 416; re Moran, 203 U. S.
96; Refusal t.o allow defendant statutory time to prepare defense, contrary
to claimed due process of law, McMicking v. Shields, 238 U. S. 99; Exclu-
sion of negroes from grand and petit juries, where no statute requires
exclusion, Wood v. Brush, 140 U. S. 278; Jugiro v. Brush, 140 U. S. 291;
Refusal of trial court to hear evidence offered to prove deliberate exclusion
of negroes from juries, Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272; Insufficiency of
facts set forth in indictment to constitute any offense, Dimmick v. Tomp-
kins, 194 U. S. 540; Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333; Bergeman v. Backer,
157 U. S. 655; Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U. S. 293; ex parte Yarborough. 110
U. S. 651; Denial of process for defendant's witnesses, ex parte Har.ling,
120 U. S. 782; That the instrument charged to have been forged was in-
capable of forgery, under the statute, ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18; Exclu-
sion of evidence by extradition commissioner, not amounting to (Ienial of
fair hearing, Collins v. Loisel, 259 U. S. 309; Cf. on this point, McNamara
v. Heinkel, 226 U. S. 520; Failure to communicate any of trial proceedings
to deaf and dumb defendant, Felts v. Murphy, 201 U. S. 123; Disqualifica-
tion of some of grand jurors, Kaizo v. Henry, 211 U. S. 146; Smaller grand
jury than required, where sufficient number concurred in indictment, ex
parte Wilson, 140 U. S. 575; Order impaneling grand jury by circuit judge
while without district, Harlan v. McGourln, 218 U. 9. 442; Holding, on trial
for second offense, former conviction, without jury, valid, ex pare Belt,
159 U. S. 95; Permitting incompetent or biased jurors, re Schneider, 148
U. S. 162; Indefiniteness of indictment, ex parte Coy, 127 U. S. 731: Vari-
ance between charge and proof, Jugiro v. Brush, 140 U. S. 291; Duplicity
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10: Error in sentence (which belongs to our second
class of subsequently vitiated initial jurisdiction) calls for
special notice. The effect of a sentence that does not follow
the law depends upon whether the legal and illegal portions
are severable. If severable the valid portion supports the
jurisdiction and no relief by habeas corpus can ordinarily be
had until it is performed.' 2
Where the variance from law is not quantitative, but is
in nature and quality so that authorized and unauthorized
portions are inseparable, the whole may be regarded as void
and habeas corpus lies.48 Even in such a case the prisoner
does not necessarily go free, but, under the equitable pro-
cedure characteristic of the federal writ, the court may remit
the prisoner to the prior tribunal for such further action by
way of correcting the sentence as may be conformable with
law. 4  If such sentence be amendable, the waste of valid
proceedings prior to sentence is avoided.
11: Examining more critically the rule that would limit
the reach of the writ to jurisdiction alone, we observe that
the question of a court's jurisdiction may involve matter of
law or matter of fact. If matter of fact, the facts may be
of indictment, failure of District Attorney to sign, ex parte Lane, 135 U. S.
443; Agreed facts insufficient to constitute crime, re Gregory, 219 U. S. 210;
Failure of verdict, contrary to statutory requirements to specify degree
of crime, re Eckert, 166 U. S. 481; Joinder in one indictment of charges,
some exclusively federal and some state, re Green, 134 U. S. 377; Defects
of form In indictment, ex parte Clark, 100 U. S. 399; Error in ruling plea
of former jeopardy, ex parte Bigelow, 113 U. S. 328; Refusal to submit to
jury lower degrees of offense charged, Crossley v. California, 168 U. S. 640.
42. U. S. v. Pridgeon, 153 U. S., 1. c. 62; in re Swan, 150 U. S., 1. c.
653; in re Bonner, 151 U. S. 242; Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U. S. 442; U. S.
v. Holtz, 288 Fed. 81; in re Welty, 123 Fed. 122; De Bara v. U. S., 99. Fed.
942.
43. In re Mills, 135 U. S. 263; ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163; re Bonner,
151 U. S. 242; ex parte Medley, 134 U. S. 160.
44. Bryant v. U. S., 214 Fed. 51; Price v. Zerbst, 268 Fed. 72; U. S. v.
Carpenter, 151 Fed. 214; ex parte Peeks, 144 Fed. 1016; in re Bonner, 151
'U. S. 242.
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(and usually are) quasi,--rather than absolutely, jurisdic-
tional. If quasi-jurisdictional, the court trying the case must
determine them and of necessity has jurisdiction so to do.4Y
Yet in a celebrated case,4 a deputy marshal, assigned
to protect a federal judge, shot and killed one who had struck
the judge and was about further to assault him. Upon com-
plaint and affidavit, a state warrant for murder was issued
and the marshal was arrested and detained for preliminary
hearing; pending which, he was discharged by federal habeas
corpus upon the ground that he was at the time engaged in
the performance of a duty imposed by federal law and the
homicide was a necessary part of that duty.
Whether that homicide was, under the circumstances,
unnecessary and uncalled for, or was apparently indispens-
able for the performance of federal duty, was a question of
fact. If of the former description, it was an offense punish-
able by the state, otherwise not. The state courts had juris-
diction (as the term is ordinarily employed) to determine
that fact.
In another case,4 an officer and soldiers were detailed
to guard government property from theft. They shot and
killed a supposed thief. Indictments were returned in a state
court upon the theory (supported by conflicting evidence)
that the deceased was shot after he had surrendered. The
Supreme Court took as conceded the power to issue habeas
corpus, but denied discharge under the doctrine of restrictive
judicial discretion. The case was not sufficiently exceptional
and the state court had jurisdiction to determine the facts.
That a federal court has power, in such cases, to examine
into the facts on habeas corpus and to discharge from custody
under pending state proceedings, is established by a number
45. See the very strong statements in Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 212 U. S.
542; also see Maust v. Warden, 283 Fed, 912.
46. Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U. S. 1.
47. United States ex rel. Drury v. .,ews, 200 U. S. 1.
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of cases decided by lower federal courts.4 1 In most of these
instances the state courts would seem to have had jurisdiction
to determine the facts; notwithstanding which the federal
court stepped in and decided the facts for itself. Therefore,
it cannot be completely accurate to say that the federal writ
reaches only jurisdiction, if the latter term be conceived from
the standpoint of the court whose proceedings are under re-
view. If we turn to cases where jurisdiction depends upon
matter of law, (rather than of fact) the state courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon and determine issues of law arising
in the case whether the law be state or federal. Error in
decision ought not to take away the jurisdiction to decide;
and the erroneous decision of a federal question of law in
a case does not render the judgment absolutely void.49
Tn one of its franker moments, 50 the Supreme Court has
intimated that in exceptional cases the writ is not confined
to jurisdictional defects. Such a complete jettison of the
frequently enunciated general rule may be avoided by stating
that rule as follows: The issuing court has power to discharge
under this revisory writ, if in its opinion (either as a matter
of law or as a matter of admissible fact) the detention is, by
reason of some federal inhibition, without jurisdiction. In
that sense (that is, from the standpoint of the issuing federal
court) it is still universally true that the writ reaches only
jurisdiction or authority. How far evidence is admissible,
with respect particularly to records, will be noted hereafter.
12: The language of the statute confers the same broad
48. Ex parte Conway, 48 Fed. 77; ex parte Jenkins, 2 Wall. Tr. 521;
ex parte Robinson, 6 McLean, 355; U. S. v. Jailer, 2 Abb. (U. S.) 265; re
Ramsey, 2 Flippin 451; re Neill, 8 BIatchford 156; ex parte Bridges, 2
Woods 428; re Waite, 81 Fed. 359; re Fair, 100 Fed. 149; re Wulzen, 235
Fed. 362; re Lewis, 83 Fed. 159; Kelly v. Georgia, 68 Fed, 52.
49. See ex parte Ulrich, 43 Fed., 1. c. 664; Cf. Glasgow v. Moyer, 225
U. S. 420.
50. Henry v. Henkel, 235 U. S. 219. Some of the lower federal courts
take this same view. Cf. ex parte Craig, 282 Fed., 1. c. 149.
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jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court to issue the writ as upon
the District Courts. In so far as the issuance of the writ is
to be regarded as an original suit or proceeding, the statute
is limited by the constitutional enumeration of the cases in
which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction. 1 That
court has avoided, for the most part, this difficulty, by re-
garding the writ as essentially appellate in character, in all
instances wherein it is sought to review the judicial decision
of some inferior court or officer.5 2 This quasi-appellate juris-
diction by habeas corpus is curtailed by no statute other than
the Habeas Corpus Act itself.53  The court views, however,
with a very jaundiced eye attempts in ordinary cases to
over-leap the inferior tribunals and burden it with the ad-
ministration of the writ. 4
As heretofore indicated, I think the jurisdiction of a
justice is not identical with that of the Supreme Court: but
he has an original jurisdiction not limited by the constitutional
restriction applicable to the Supreme Court.5 5 Where the
case is. quasi-appellate in character, he may make it return-
able or adjourn it before the whole court for hearing and
determination.5" Save as an ancillary writ, neither the Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals5" nor (in spite of decisions to the con-
trary5") their judges,59 as such, have power to issue; and the
51. 'Ex parte Hung Hang, 108 U. S. 552; ex parte Barry, 2 How. 65;
ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85.
52. Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85; ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S., 1. c. 374.
375; ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 1. c. 101; ex parte Metzger, 5 How., I. c.
189; ex parte Hung Hang, 108 U. S., 1. c. 553; ex parte Watkins, 7 Pet., 1. c.
572; ex parte Milburn, 9 Pet. 704.
53. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371; ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85.
54. Ex parte Tracy, 249 U. S. 551; ex parte Mirzan, 119 U. S. 584; in
re Huntington, 137 U. S. 63; ex parte Hudgings, 249 U. S., 1. c. 379; ex parte
Terry, *I28 U. S., 1. c. 302.
55. Ex parte Clarke, 100 U. S. 399; Cf. ex parte Kalne, 14 How., 1. c.
131.
56. Ibidem; cf. ex parte Curtis, 106 U. S. 371.
57. Whitney v. Dick, 202 U. S. 132; ex parte Craig, 282 Fed. 138;
58. Ex parte Lamar, 274 Fed. 160.
59. Craig v. Hecht, 68 Co-op. Adv., 124; ex parte Craig, 282 Fed. 138.
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same is necessarily true of the Court of Claims and the Court
of Customs Appeals, and their respective judges.1 a
13: The application for the writ must be addressed to
the court or judge within whose territorial jurisdiction the
imprisonment has its situs.60 Such application must be by
verified petition in writing setting forth the facts of the de-
tention, the authority claimed therefor (if known) and in
whose custody the petitioner is detained.61 It should make
plain on its face the want of jurisdiction or authority.8 2
Averments of fact must be clear, unambiguous and not in the
form of legal conclusion. 3 If the detention is claimed to
be illegal because of the invalidity or insufficiency of process
or proceedings, copies thereof should be annexed or the essen-
tials thereof set out in the body of the petition.6 4  Where
insufficiency of evidence is complained of, the same rule as
to reciting the substance or attaching copies thereof applies.3
Generally speaking, the pleading and procedure partake of
an equitable, rather than a strict legal, nature, The right
of amendment is liberally granted.6s Where it appears from
59a. Because no statute granting the Jurisdiction.
60. Ex parte Gouyet, 175 Fed., 1. c. 233; cf. People v. Asylum, 68 N. Y.
Supp. 279; U. S. v. Davis, 5 Cranch (C. C.) 622; re Boles, 48 Fed. 75; ex
parte Young, 50 Fed. 526.
61. I. S. 754.
62. For Instances of petitions, see ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18; Slocum
v. Brush, 140 U. S. 698; ex parte Cross, 146 U. S. 271; re Schneider, 148
U. S. 162; Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U. S. 231; Harkrader v. Wadley, 172
U. S. 148; ex parte Baez, 177 U. S. 378.
63. Invalidity of legal conclusions, see Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225
U. S. 460; Craemer v. Washington, 168 U. S. 124; Whitten v. Tomlinson. 160
U. S. 231.
64. Craemer v. Washington, 168 U. S. 124; Low Wah Suey v. Backus,
225 U. S. 460; Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U. S., 1. c. 279; Haw Moy v. North,
188 Fed. 89.
65. Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U. S., 1. c. 279; Hyde v. Shine, 199 V. S.,
1. c. 85.
66. R. S. 760; amendment of traverse, ex parte Gilroy, 257 Fed.. 1. c.
111; Haas v. Henkel, 166 Fed., 1. a. 624; Storti v. Massachusetts, 18. U. S.,
1. c. 143.
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fie face of the application that the prisoner must be remanded
to original custody, the issuance of the writ is refused.
0 7
Sometimes, when in doubt or convenience requires the court
or judge will issue- an order to show cause why the writ should
not be issued; to which return is made (without production
of the prisoner) and the writ is not granted or refused until,
and as a part of, the final adjudication of the cause. Such
is the ordinary practice of the Supreme Court Pg8
14: If ordered issued upon the filing of the application,
the writ is addressed to that person, in immediate custody
of the prisoner, who has power to produce his: body pursuant
to the exigence of the writ.0  The addressee of the writ is
required by the statute to make due return"0 thereof within
three days, unless the prisoner be detained beyond the dis-
tance of twenty miles; in which latter event, the time is
enlarged according to distance2" It does not appear to be
usual for .the writ to specify particularly the day and hour
for return. The return must certify the true cause of the
detention ;" and the body of the prisoner should be produced
when it is made. 3 Demurrer to petition occurs occasion-
ally.?7 a Wilful failure to obey the command of the writ is
67. In re Boardman, 169 U. S., 1. c. 43; in re Burrus, 136 U. S., 1. c.
601; ex parte Terry, 128 U. S., L c. 301; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 3.09;
re HaskelI, 52 Fed. 795; U, S. v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 259.
68. See, ax pane Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651; ex parte Baez, 177 U. S.
378; ex parte Burrus, 136 U. S. 586; Horn v. Mitchell, 232 Fed. 819; swe
form of order to show cause, ex parte Henry, 123 U. S. 372.
69. R. S. 755; Wales v. Whitney, 114 U. S. 564.
70. It. S. 756; Seavey v. Seymour, 3 Cliff. 439.
71. R. S. 756.
72. R. S. 757.
73. R. S. 758; may be dispensed with, see re Medley, 134 U. S. 176;
ex parte Baez, 177 7. S. 378.
73a. See, Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86; Low WVah Suey v. Backus,
225 U. S. 460; Choy Gum v. Backus,. 223 Fed. 491; Cf. in re Thaw, 166 Fed.
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a punishable contempt ;74 semblc, either of court or judge as
the case may be.
Upon return and production, and pending hearing and
'determinafion, the prisoner is in the power and subject to
the control of the court or judge issuing the writ. 5 He is
-detained not under the original commitment, but under the
-rit of habeas corpus.h Until conclusion of that proceeding
lie may be bailed or remanded to the old, or remitted to some
new, custody, subject to the order of the court or judge?7
15: Unless required by local rule, the return need not
1e verified:78 Until contradicted or impeached, it imports
absolute verity.7 Such clear and unambiguous averments in
the application as are not controverted by the return, stand
admitted.' Its denials should be specific and not general.
Judging by the precedents, the petitioner may demur,81 or
reply to the return 2 The reply may deny (specifically) all
or portions of the return, or set forth such further facts as
are material in explanation or avoidance.3 It must be veri-
fied.34 The statute fixes no time for filing demurrer or reply.
Unless regulated by local rule, the time must be fixed by
special order or general practice of the court.
74. Ex parte Field, 5 Blatchford, 63; as to judge, cf. Barney v. Barney,
6 D. C. 1.
75. Barth v. Clise, 12 Wall. 400; ex parte Thaw, 209 Fed., 1. c, 75, Stall-
Ings v. Shlain, 253 U. S., 1. c. 342.
76. Ibidem.
77. Ibidem; re Kaine, 14 How., 1. c. 133.
78. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86; Stretton v. Rudy, 176 F.d.
730.
79. Ibidem.
80. Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U. S. 231; U. S. v. MWDonald, 265 Fed.
754; Stretton v. Rudy, 176 Fed. 727.
81. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S., 1. a. 88, in re Bloch, 87 Fed., 1. C.
982; re Ah Toy, 45 Fed., 1. c. 795.
82. IF. S. 760.
83. Ibidem; ex parte Cuddy, 131 U. S., 1. 0. 283.
84. R. S. 760; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S., 1. c. 330.
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Upon return of the Writ, a day is set for the hearing of
the cause; not exceeding five days thereafter, unless the
petitioner asks a longer time.85 If the demurrer to the return
should be overruled, I suppose the court or judge might, at
discretion, permit traverse by way of amendment.80
16: "The court or justice or judge shall proceed in a
summary way to determine the facts of the case, by hearing
the testimony and arguments, and thereupon to dispose of
the party as law and justice require."87
The foregoing statutory provision is taken from the law
of 1867.88
By "the facts of the case" must be meant such facts as
are material under the writ; and these ought to be only such
as (at least in the opinion of the issuing federal court) bear
upon the question of jurisdiction or authority. What facts
are to be deemed such must depend largely upon the char-
acter and object of the detention attacked.
As a matter of constitutional law the grant of judicial
pover is broad enough to include both appellate and original
jurisdictlon. Bott kinds of jurisdiction (subject to the con-
stitutional limitation of the original jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court) may be vested in any federal court. Apart
from whatever effect (in especial cases) may be given to the
Seventh Amendment, limiting the review of facts found by
juries in certain causes, I know of nothing in the constitution
which prohibits Congress from modifying and enlarging the
common law incidents of the writ of habeas corpus, so as to
enable federal courts, in favor of liberty, to review the juris-
dictional facts as found or recited by state or other tribunals
in the proceedings attacked. In other words, the question
85. . S. 759.
86. Cf. Haas v. Henikel, 166 Fed. 621.
87. R. S. 861.
88. 14 Stat. 385.
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under this statute is not one of governmental power, but of
interpretation.
The main difficulty, of course, would be in dealing with
file judicial record of another court.
As a matter of pure logic, if such a record recites or
implies a falsehood and the actual truth destroys jurisdiction,
it is not entirely plain to me why that truth should not be
shown as part of "the facts of the case" which the court is
authorized by the statute to determine.
17: Undoubtedly there are grave objections to such a
purely logical construction of the statutory language. The
original Habeas Corpus Act in Great Britain was never so
interpreted as to authorize the issuing court to go behind
the record of any court of general jurisdiction. Our own
ieports have many times asserted, and repeatedly assumed in
argument, that the writ is a mere collateral attack as against
a judgment.s9 The dangers involved in summarily annulling,
upon grounds of fact, the orderly and ordinary findings of
courts and juries-in disregarding the usual appellate pro-
cesses-advise a narrower interpretation, which is, moreover,
supported by the language and reasoning of many decisions.
On the other hand, the enactment of this new statutory pro-
vision was not meaningless. It must have been intended to
change the existing law; and its passage renders doubtful as
authority all the preceding cases. To hold that the expres-
sion or implication of the record attacked precludes any in-
quiry into facts absolutely jurisdictional is contrary to the
rule of general jurisprudence. To leave the power with state
tribunals, where federal rights are involved, to fix conclu-
sively, by the expression or implication of their records,
quasi-juisdictional facts, would nullify the effectiveness of
89. Ex parte Frederich, 149 U. S. 70; U. S. v. Pridgeon, 153 U. s., 1. c.
59; Andersen v. Treat, 172 U. S., 1. c. 31; re Cuddy, 131 U. S., 1. c. 285;
Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U. S., 1. c. 447; Riddle v. Dydhe, 262 U. S., 1. c. 336.
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the federal writs in all cases where such facts are involved
in a judgment; and such a rule would make a ghastly joke of
the general restrictive requirement of error or appeal before
resorting to habeas corpus.
18: In a quite recent and very celebrated case,90 the
Supreme Court said that the effect of this statute was "to
substitute for the bare legal review that seems to have been
the limit of judicial authority under the common law prac-
tice * * * a more searching investigation, in which the
applicant is put upon his oath to set forth the truth of the
matter respecting the causes of his detention and the court,
upon determining the actual facts, is to "dispose of the party
as law and justice require." * * * It results that under
the sections cited a prisoner in custody pursuant to the final
judgment of a state court of criminal jurisdiction may have
a judicia] inquiry in a court of the United States into the
very truth and substance of the causes of his detention,
although it may become necessary to look behind and beyond
the record of his conviction to a sufficient extent to test the
jurisdiction of the state court to proceed against him." (Ital-
ics ours.) 91
If such be the power, under this statute, of the federal
courts in habeas corpus where a state court is concerned,
I see no reason for declining similarly to interpret the statute
where the record of a federal court is under review. Of
course, in the latter case, the rule of restrictive judicial dis-
eretion would be more closely applied.
If the rule announced in the foregoing quotation is cor-
rect, then it seems to me to reinforce our conclusion that the
question of jurisdiction is to be regarded (for purposes of
the writ) from the standpoint of the issuing federal court;
and, further, gravely to impair the oft-repeated statement
that the writ is a form of collateral attack.
90. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309.
91. Ibidem, 1. c. 331.
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19: Under that rule, I am unable to see any real or sub-
stantial distinction between what a judicial record expressly
recites and what it by implication involves. The cases seem
to make such a distinction. The last decision of the Supxeme
Court asserts that the Frank case was not meant "to abrogate
the rule established by prior decisions, that the record may
iot be contradicted collaterally; at least, where, as here,
jurisdiction of the cause or parties is not involved. '" 92
One is almost tempted to retort that evidence that does
not bear upon jurisdiction ought never to be material in a
habeas corpus case; and that the qualification italicised
amounts to a begging of the whole question.
The particular decision is interesting as an instance of
the process of recession found necessary by the court. It
holds, in effect, that if the record shows, in a felony case, a
"good and lawful jury," whereas in truth it consisted of
only five men, or two men, either the point is not jurisdic-
tional, and cannot be reached by habeas corpus, or, if
jiirisdictional, the record to the contrary is conclusive.
The first alternative hardly squares with the expression
of some earlier cases ;93 and the second, in view of the lan-
guage of the statute, seems equally applicable in principle to
all state cases.
It seems plain that the court feels bound to limit lati-
ludinarian tendencies in the construction of the statute, and
does not like to rest itself solely upon the principle of extraor-
dinary remedy and restrictive judicial discretion.
20: From very early days, we find petitions for, and
allowances of, certiorari as ancillary to the writ of habeas
92. Riddle v. Dyche, 262 U. S., 1. c. 336; see also, in addition to Frank
case, ex parte Terry, 128 U. S., 1. c. 305; re Cuddy, 131 U. S. 280, I. c. 286;
In re Mayfield, 141 U. S., I. c. 116; In re Lennon, 166 U. S., 1. c. 553; Har-
lan v. McGourin, 218 U. S. 442; re Gavin, 131 U. S., 1. c. 276; Givens v.
Zeribst, 255 U. S. 11.
93. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343.
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corpu§, to bring up the record of the proceedings founding
the imprisonment complained of.9 4  The grant of certiorari
is purely discretionary;95 and for this reason (among others)
it is imprudent to omit from the petition for habeas corpus
the stunmary of evidence or recital of proceedings herein-
above referred to.90 The award and return of the certiorari
should not affect the general rule as to the reach and scope
of habeas corpus, or convert the latter into a proceeding for
the review of mere errors ;97 although there are occasional
cases very difficult to explain, consistently with that rule.08
The use of certiorari may frequently dispense with the
taking of evidence, and so expedite the proceeding, by mak-
ing the issue substantially one of law.
NOTE-The concluding installment of this article will be published in
the November Issue.-Ed.
94. See ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75; ex parte Yarborough, 110
U. S. 651; ex parte Burford, 3 Cranch, 448; In re Kaine, 14 How. 103;
Bessette v. Conkey Co., 194 U. S., 1. c. 336; McNamara v. Henkel, 226 U. S.
520; Benson v. McMahon, 127 U. S. 457; ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85; ex
parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163; ex parte Harding, 120 U. S. 782.
95. Hyde v. Shine, 199 U. S. 62.
96. Ibidem.
97. Many cases in which certiorari was granted repeat the rule con-
fining the writ to jurisdiction; such, e. g., as ex parte Lennon, 166 U. S.
548; ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339; ex parte Harding, 120 U. S. 782.
98. Cf. in re Watts, 190 U. S. 1.
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